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Abstract
The business literature has long recognized the importance of multinationals’
distribution networks. The empirical analysis of distribution-oriented FDI has,
however, received little attention which is at least partly due to the lack of ap-
propriate data. We outline a slightly modified version of Helpman, Melitz, and
Yeaple (2004) that explicitly models the possibility for a multinational firm
to export through its wholesale trade affiliate in order to analyze multina-
tional firms’ choice between foreign production and foreign distribution. The
subsequent empirical analysis uses different discrete choice models. We use al-
ternative specifications and report estimation results for several sub-samples
of multinational firms. We also consider more complex foreign sales strategies
and correct for the sample selection bias that arises because we only observe
firms that have foreign affiliates. Our results show that the decision between
distribution and production-oriented FDI is based on the trade-off between
fixed and variable costs.
Keywords: Multinational firms, Wholesale sales, Discrete choice
JEL classification: F23, F12, C25
Corresponding author: Jo¨rn Kleinert Mohlstr. 36 72074 Tu¨bingen, Germany,
Tel.: +49 7071 2974137, Email: j.kleinert@uni-tuebingen.de
?This paper has substantially benefited from the comments of Mary Amiti, Peter
Egger, Horst Raff, Jim Markusen, Peter Neary, John Romalis, Beata Smarzynska,
Nicolas Schmitt, and Maurizio Zanardi. This paper has partly been written while
the authors visited the Research Centre of the Deutsche Bundesbank. The hospi-
tality of the Bundesbank, as well as access to the Bundesbank’s micro-database
”MIDI” are gratefully acknowledged. This research has received financial support
from the Franco-German ANR/DFG program on ”FDI in services”. We are, of
course, responsible for any remaining errors.
1 Introduction
A striking feature of the new globalization process is the role played by multi-
national firms. Many studies have documented the overwhelming role of multi-
national firms in international trade. According to UNCTAD (2002), one-third
of world trade is intra-firm, and another third involves the participation of
multinational firms. Kiyota and Urata (2005) report that in 2000, 95% of
Japanese exports and 85.5% of Japanese imports were carried out by multina-
tional firms and that half of the trade of Japanese firms took place within their
boundaries. Clausing (2000) reports a similar intra-firm trade share for trade
between the EU and the U.S. Intra-firm trade includes trade in intermediate
goods among different units of multinational firms. However, intra-firm trade
in final goods from the parent firm to wholesale trade affiliates accounts for
the largest fraction.
The business literature has long recognized the important role of multination-
als’ distribution networks (Caves, 1971; Dunning, 1993; Hirsch, 1993; Gray,
1999). According to Daniels (2000), the rapid expansion of FDI mostly re-
lied on the growth of multinational activities in downstream activities such
as wholesale trade and after-sales services. In the international economics lit-
erature, the empirical analysis of distribution-oriented FDI has received less
attention, which is at least partly due to the lack of appropriate data. Using
data from U.S. affiliates of Japanese firms, Zeile (1997) reports the important
role of wholesale trade affiliates in intra-firm trade. Looking at this intra-firm
trade from a different angle, Greaney (2005) reports that in 1997, the ex-
port activities of Japanese wholesale trade affiliates represent 66.7% of total
Japanese exports. 1
1This result confirms the findings of Kimura and Ando (2003).
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Wholesale trade accounts not only for an important share of foreign trade but
also makes up for an important share of foreign affiliate sales. Fontagne´ and
Toubal (2010) use data for France and report that wholesale trade affiliates
account for almost 15% of total foreign affiliates’ sales and for 20% of French
multinational firms’ total foreign employment. They also show that nearly 10%
of the total number of subsidiaries abroad are active in the foreign wholesale
sector. Fryges (2007) reports that German wholesale trade affiliates account
for about 50% of German multinational firms’ foreign sales in 2003. Using data
for U.S. firms for 1998, Hanson et al. (2005) report that the share of sales by
foreign wholesale trade affiliates in total foreign sales by U.S. firms ranges
from 9.7% for U.S. parents in transportation equipment to 37% for parents
in industrial machinery. Anderson (2008) confirms the importance of foreign
wholesale trade affiliates in the U.S. but notes that their importance has some-
what declined and argues that this is because ”some wholesale trade affiliates
[reoriented] from importing manufactured goods for sale in the United States
to manufacturing goods at U.S. facilities” (Anderson, 2008: 196, footnote 9).
This paper analyzes the foreign sales strategies of multinational firms. Our
theoretical framework is related to the work of Helpman et al. (2004), who
introduce firm-level heterogeneity in a proximity-concentration model of the
multinational firm. Our model differs from theirs in that we model explicitly
the option of a multinational firm to export through its wholesale trade af-
filiate. We assume that multinational firms can produce goods abroad or set
up wholesale trade affiliates to sell their goods. In contrast to the previous
literature, we analyze multinational firms’ choice between foreign production
and foreign distribution. We assume that markets are segmented by trade
costs that increase the price of goods shipped to a foreign country. Trade
costs affect the sales of wholesale trade affiliates negatively, but they do not
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affect the sales of production affiliates. However, the fixed costs necessary to
establish production in a foreign production plant are higher than the fixed
costs of wholesale trade. Exporting through wholesale trade affiliates and pro-
ducing abroad yield different prices and quantities and, thus, different profits.
The resulting equilibrium strategy arises endogenously from the comparison of
the expected profits. Thus, trade costs affect the relative profits of producing
abroad positively, whereas fixed costs affect it negatively.
We use detailed data on multinational firms’ foreign activities. The data pro-
vide a geographical breakdown of foreign affiliates of German multinational
firms and comprise panel information from 1996 to 2003 that allows us to
distinguish between wholesale trade affiliates and production affiliates. The
data are supplemented with sector- and host-country-specific variables. The
empirical analysis uses the discrete choice methodology in different economet-
ric models. We use different specifications and report estimation results for
different sub-samples of multinational firms. We also consider more complex
foreign sales strategies and correct for the sample selection bias that arises
because we only observe firms that have foreign affiliates. Our main results
are robust to changes in the sample and the econometric specification. We find
that trade costs have the expected positive effect on the likelihood to produce
abroad, while plant-level set-up costs reduce the likelihood to produce abroad.
A larger foreign market size and lower sector-specific production costs increase
the probability of setting up production affiliates. Finally, as predicted by our
heterogenous firm model, the size of the parent firm increases the probability
of producing abroad.
The paper is related to the recent strand of literature studying the role of
wholesalers in international trade, focusing on their role in trade intermedi-
ation (Blum et al., 2009; Bernard et al., 2009). 2 Wholesale trade affiliates
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in our study are not intermediaries but integrated units of a manufacturing
firm that operate in a foreign market. We examine the decision of multina-
tional firms to serve the foreign market through wholesale trade or to produce
there. Our paper is, therefore, also related to a broader literature that exam-
ines the relationship between foreign production and export (Brainard, 1997;
Markusen and Venables, 1998, 2000; Helpman et al., 2004).
The empirical literature relying on aggregate data gives support to the model
of horizontal multinationals in which outward FDI substitutes for exports
(Brainard, 1997; Blonigen et al., 2003; Buch et al., 2005; Carr et al., 2001;
Kleinert and Toubal, 2010). 3 However, empirical studies that use firm-level
data find mixed evidence (Hanson et al., 2005; Blonigen, 2001). In our paper,
multinationals face a decision between foreign production and foreign distri-
bution. This choice only partly reflects the export versus affiliate production
common to most of the models in the literature but does certainly show up in
the aggregated data.
The paper is divided into six sections. In the following section, we derive a
simple version of the proximity-concentration model. Thus, we focus explicitly
on the decision made by the firm. We present our estimation strategy in section
three and explain how we apply the model to the data. In section four, we
give detailed information on our firm-level database. We present the empirical
results in section five. We summarize and conclude in section six.
2This literature is mainly based on theories of trade intermediation that improves
the matching between producers and consumers (see Antra´s and Costinot, 2009;
Rauch and Watson, 2004; or Petropoulou, 2007). Our focus differs since we analyze
the behavior of multinational firms that are not intermediaries.
3The traditional classification has been into horizontal and vertical FDI. Horizontal
FDI occurs when a multinational duplicates its activities abroad to serve the foreign
market. Vertical FDI occurs when a multinational firm splits its production process
across borders.
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2 A stylized model of production versus distribution-oriented FDI
In this section, we outline the two-country, two-sector, one-factor general-
equilibrium model that explains firms’ internationalization strategies. The
only factor of production is labor which might differ in average productiv-
ity between the two countries. All individuals are identical in offering one unit
of labor. There are two sectors: (i) a perfect-competition sector producing a
homogenous good and (ii) a monopolistic-competition sector producing dif-
ferentiated goods. The production process in the differentiated-goods sector
requires fixed costs at the company level (to generate a headquarters service)
and fixed costs at the plant level (to produce the goods). Consumers are as-
sumed to love variety. They choose from a bundle of different varieties, which
are symmetric in the sense that the constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
is the same for any two varieties. In aggregate, consumers’ decisions are sum-
marized in those of the representative consumer, who buys an average amount
qi of each variety i depending on its price pi.
Markets are segmented by ”iceberg” trade costs, which affect the price of
goods that are exported through a wholesale affiliate. Therefore, these goods
are sold at a higher price abroad than at home. However, the trade costs do not
affect the price of goods that are produced abroad. Thus, the level of trade
costs affects the relative profitability of selling through a wholesale affiliate
and producing abroad. With high trade costs, producing abroad is the more
profitable strategy, while with low trade costs, selling through a wholesale
affiliate is more profitable. Low wages in the foreign country relative to the
home country increase the relative profitability of producing abroad.
Optimal pricing in monopolistic competition models that rely on a CES util-
ity representation always involves a fixed markup over marginal costs c, i.e.
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p = c/ρ, where 1/ρ is the inverse of the degree of differentiation between
varieties. It determines the degree of monopoly power of a firm. All firms
charge prices that are proportional to their marginal costs in equilibrium.
Marginal costs, in turn, have a firm-specific component stemming from the
firm-specific productivity and a country-specific component stemming from
country-specific wages wj with j = H,F denoting, respectively, the home and
the foreign country.
Firms choose their optimal prices for both markets independently. The in-
ternationalization decision depends only on the profits earned in the foreign
market, denoted by F . Firm i from country H serves consumers in the foreign
market F through a wholesale affiliate (WS ) or a production unit (M ) if at
least one of the alternatives yields positive profits pihiF > 0 where h = WS,M .
Variable profits (net of fixed costs) in the foreign country differ with respect
to the mode of servicing the foreign market because of trade costs and the
wage differential. Furthermore, the internationalization decision depends on
the additional fixed costs FF with FF = FM − FWS incurred if the firm pro-
duces abroad. Each firm chooses its mode of foreign market supply by solving
the profit comparison given in equation (1). As noted above, firms differ with
respect to their productivity. Profits are firm-specific because prices and quan-
tities depend on the firm-specific productivity.
Πi = (p
M
iF − cMiF )qMiF − (pWSiF − cNiH)qWSiF − FF | piWSiF ∨ (piMiF − FF ) ≥ 0
(1)
with qWSiF =
(pWSiF )
−1/(1−ρ)
(PF )−ρ/(1−ρ)
YF , p
WS
iF = p
WS
iH e
τ
and qMiF =
(pMiF )
−1/(1−ρ)
(PF )−ρ/(1−ρ)
YF
The superscripts M and WS stand for multinational firms that produce
abroad and those selling through a wholesale affiliate, respectively. The sub-
6
scripts H and F denote home and foreign as the location of consumption. For
instance, qWSiF denotes the quantity of the variety produced by firm i that is
sold in market F through a wholesale affiliate. We define variable profits as
profits net of fixed costs and denote them by pi. The first term on the right
side of equation (1), (pMiF − cMiF )qMiF , gives the variable profits of a firm that
produces in the foreign market. The second term, (pWSiF − cNiH)qWSiF , stands
for the variable profits that firm i realizes in the foreign market when it sells
through a wholesale affiliate. The third term, FF , denotes the additional fixed
costs incurred if firm i sets-up an additional plant to produce abroad.
If the profit difference Πi is smaller than zero, firm i prefers to sell its goods
through a wholesale affiliate. If Πi is larger than zero, it decides to produce
abroad. The decision depends on the price and the quantity sold in the foreign
market under the different regimes. Both are a function of the variable costs
chj with j = H,F and h = M,N , the price index PF in the foreign market,
and the market size YF for the differentiated good.
3 Estimation strategy
The theory predicts systematic differences between multinational firms selling
through a wholesale affiliate and firms that produce abroad. We estimate
equation (1) using a probabilistic model. In our empirical analysis, we consider
many sectors indexed by k and many countries indexed by j. Each firm chooses
its strategy in each foreign market separately. Accordingly, equation (1) can
be written as Πijk =
(
piMijk − piWSijk
)
− Fk. Restating the profit comparison
reveals that firm i produces abroad if Fk <
(
piMijk − piWSijk
)
and sells through its
wholesale unit if Fk >
(
piMijk − piWSijk
)
. We express this comparison in terms of
the relative (variable) profits of both alternatives
(
piWSijk /pi
M
ijk
)
.
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1− Fk
piMijk

> pi
WS
ijk
piM
ijk
if Πijk > 0
<
piWSijk
piM
ijk
if Πijk < 0
(2)
We define the profit of selling through a wholesale affiliate relative to the
profits of producing in country j as φijk ≡ piWSijk /piMijk and write profits as a
fraction of sales which are, in turn, a function of the unit production costs
ciHk or c
M
ijk, trade costs τHj, the mark-up 1/ρ, the (negatively) weighted price
index Pjk in industry k of country j, and the size Yjk of industry k in country
j. Thus, φijk can be written as:
φijk =
(1− ρ)/ρρ/(1−ρ)(ciHk)−ρ/(1−ρ)(τHj)−ρ/(1−ρ)
(1− ρ)/ρρ/(1−ρ)(cMijk)−ρ/(1−ρ)
Pjk
Pjk
Yjk
Yjk
(3a)
=
(ciHk)
−ρ/(1−ρ)(τHj)−ρ/(1−ρ)
(cMijk)
−ρ/(1−ρ) (3b)
The degree of differentiation disappears from the relative profit equation be-
cause it is the same for firm i in both modes. The price index and the market
size in j cancel too.
We estimate a log-linearized version of equation (3b). Log linearizing gives
lnφijk =
ρ
(1− ρ)
(
ln(cMijk)− ln(ciHk)
)
− ρ
1− ρln(τj) (4)
Denoting the left side of equation (2) by Ψijk ≡ 1 − FkpiM
ijk
and taking the
logarithms, we obtain a non-linear term, which is a function of plant-level
fixed costs scaled by firm-specific profits.
lnΨijk = ln
(
1− Fk
piMijk
)
(5)
Thus, the log-linearized version of equation (2) is given by equation (6) as
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ln
(
1− Fk
piMijk
)
> ρ
(1−ρ)
(
ln(cMijk)− ln(ciHk)
)
− ρ
1−ρ ln(τj) if Πijk > 0
< ρ
(1−ρ)
(
ln(cMijk)− ln(ciHk)
)
− ρ
1−ρ ln(τj) if Πijk < 0
(6)
We can infer from the data that Πijk is larger than zero if we observe that
firm i has a foreign production plant in a particular country j. Similarly, Πijk
is smaller than zero when we observe that the firm owns a foreign wholesale
trade affiliate. For each firm, we observe the chosen strategy for each country.
We can thus define a discrete variable Iijk with the outcome
Iijk =

1 if firm i produces in sector k in country j
0 if firm i owns a wholesale trade affiliate in j .
Rewriting equation (6) by bringing ln(Ψijk) to the right side and defining the
difference positively, we derive the equation to estimate
Iijk = β1
(
ln(ciHk)− ln(cMijk)
)
+ β2ln(τj) + ln
(
1− Fk
piMijk
)
(7)
with β1 =
ρ
(1−ρ) and β2 =
ρ
(1−ρ) . Note that according to our model, the fixed
costs are sector specific. However, they are scaled by firm-specific profits piMijk.
Thus, while the fixed costs are identical for all firms that own affiliates in the
same sector, the scaling is specific to the firm. The more productive firms,
those that sell more and generate, thereby, more profits, split their fixed costs
over more units than less productive firms. They are, therefore, more likely to
engage in foreign production.
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4 Data, sample, and regression equation
We use a comprehensive database on foreign affiliates of German firms. 4 The
database provides the balance sheets of all foreign affiliates of German firms
and some information from their income statements. We know the sector classi-
fication of each affiliate and its parent. Unfortunately, we cannot trace affiliate-
parent pairs before 1996. Neither we have information for some explanatory
variables after 2003. Thus, we are restricted to the 1996 to 2003 time span. Our
data contains 231,082 observations, i.e. parent-affiliate-year combinations. 5
The theory outlined above is best suited to explain the foreign activities of
firms in the manufacturing sector. Therefore, we focus on manufacturing par-
ent firms and eliminate those parents that are classified in the service sector,
in the agro-business industry and in the mining industry. This reduces our
sample to 110,306 observations.
4.1 Endogenous variable
Our first step is to distinguish firms that serve foreign customers through a
wholesale affiliate from firms that produce abroad. A firm is defined as selling
through a wholesale trade unit if the manufacturing parent owns only foreign
affiliates that are classified in the wholesale sector in a particular country.
A firm is defined as producing abroad if at least one of its foreign affiliates
in a particular country is active in the manufacturing sector. In the multi-
country and multi-sector database, a particular parent firm may sell through a
4 See Lipponer (2009) for a detailed description of the data and the definition of
FDI underlying the German FDI statistics.
5This number slightly exceeds the number of affiliate-year-combinations (222,701),
because some affiliates are owned by a joint venture of two or more German par-
ent firms. Thus, there are more parent-affiliate combinations than affiliates in the
sample.
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wholesale trade affiliate in one country and produce abroad in another country.
That is consistent with the bilateral theory laid out above.
The descriptive analysis reveals that affiliates of German multinationals from
manufacturing are strongly concentrated in the manufacturing sector and in
the wholesale sector as (implicitly) assumed in proximity concentration mod-
els. Only about 16% of the affiliates of manufacturing firms are classified in the
service sector. Since we cannot explain these affiliates within the framework
described above, we drop these observations from our sample. That reduces
the number of observations further. Table 1 gives a short, descriptive summary
on the construction of our sample.
– Insert Table 1 about here –
We use the sector classification of the foreign affiliate to construct the discrete
dependent variable, which is set to one if a foreign affiliate is classified in
manufacturing and to zero if it is classified in wholesale. We believe that our
proxy reflects the decision accurately, because we only consider manufacturing
parent firms. 6
Our theory is related to multinational firms of the horizontal type. We define
horizontal multinationals as firms that engage in the same activities at home
and abroad. From an empirical point of view, the parent and the foreign af-
filiate must be classified in the same industry. In our sample, 90.2% of the
affiliates are either active in the same sector as their parent firm or in whole-
sale. This composition is consistent with the proximity-concentration theory. 7
Alfaro and Charleton (2009) use the sector classification at the four-digit level
6 Since we do not take into account the parent firms that are classified in the
wholesale sector, the wholesale trade affiliates are different from simple trade in-
termediaries. They sell goods produced at home, as reported by Anderson (2008).
7We use the two-digit NACE classification to derive the information indicating
whether the multinational meets this necessary condition. The two-digit classifi-
cation distinguishes 16 non-service sectors. The share of firms meeting the criteria
is only slightly smaller if we use 64 manufacturing sectors instead.
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to analyze the importance of horizontal multinational firms. They find that
about half of the total number of firms are classified in exactly the same sector
as their parent firms. 8
4.2 Explanatory variables
As derived above, we explain the decision to sell through a wholesale affiliate
or to produce abroad by the logarithmic difference of the marginal costs of
production for both strategies, the trade costs between the home and the host
country, and the scaled fixed costs for the additional plant when producing
abroad. Since both marginal costs and trade costs are not directly measurable,
we need to find proxies for these explanatory variables. We use sector wages in
the host country as a proxy for marginal costs. That is in line with our theory,
which models labor as the only factor of production. Differences in produc-
tivity are modeled among firms, not among countries. Moreover, firms can
transfer their productivity to the foreign country when they produce abroad.
Thus, the marginal costs of production at home and abroad differ because
wages differ between the countries.
Sector wages are available at the two-digit NACE level. They are taken from
the CEPII (2008) online database on trade and production. Wages are deflated
to constant 1995 prices and converted into US dollar using the 1995 exchange
rates. 9 For each sector, we subtract the logarithm of the wage of the partner
country from the logarithm of the German wage. This gives us an explanatory
8They do not provide information on the proportion of affiliates in the wholesale
trade sector.
9 Equation (7) involves only real variables. The price indexes cancel in equation
(5). In our empirical analysis, we compare decisions at different points in time. To
make these decisions comparable, we must eliminate the price effects of inflation
and exchange rate changes. For the expected fixed costs, this is done by scaling.
Trade costs are captured by variables that are unaffected by inflation and exchange
rate changes.
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variable, which might also take negative values.
Trade costs are captured by distance, a border dummy, and a trade openness
index. In the baseline regression, we assume that trade costs are a function of
distance and a border dummy with the flexible form: τ = η(Distance)λeδ border.
In the other regressions, we also include a trade openness index. We think that
trade openness is a better (reverse) measure of trade costs than tariffs because
it includes non-tariff barriers, which are certainly more important than tariff
barriers for our sample, which includes many observations from OECD coun-
tries (74.9%). Moreover, the number of observations from EU countries is high
(55.3%). While the variance of tariffs between OECD countries is low but pos-
itive, the variance is necessarily zero for EU countries. Unfortunately, trade
openness is not available for all countries. Although including trade openness
does not reduce the sample very much (0.7% of observations), it reduces the
number of countries in the analysis to a larger degree (32.9%).
Geographical distance is taken from the distances database (CEPII, 2008).
The geodesic distances in kilometers are calculated following the great circle
formula, which uses latitudes and longitudes of the most important cities
or agglomerations (in terms of population). The index of trade openness is
taken from several issues of the Global Competitiveness Report from the World
Economic Forum. The index runs from 1 for the most restrictive to 7 for the
most open country. Since the trade cost variables are country-specific, we also
control for sector-specific trade costs using a set of sector-specific dummy
variables.
The third explanatory variable in equation (7) is scaled fixed costs of producing
abroad. In theory, this sector specific variable is known. However, we cannot
observe the fixed costs directly because we do not know the potential fixed
costs of producing abroad for firms that have decided to serve the foreign
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market through a wholesale trade affiliate. Therefore, we calculate expected
fixed costs of affiliate production for a firm in each sector. The database on
foreign affiliates contains information on fixed assets at the level of the foreign
affiliates. We proxy the expected fixed costs by the sector average of the fixed
assets for each sector.
As required by the model, we scale the average fixed costs. As the scaling
factor, we use sales in the foreign market rather than profits. In theory, this
does not change the results because profits are a fixed share of sales. Regarding
the data, we believe that sales are less sensitive to accounting standards, profit
transfers, and other effects that are not related to the decision to sell through
a wholesale affiliate or to produce abroad. Theory tells us that fixed costs
are scaled by the sales of the foreign production unit regardless of whether
production abroad is chosen or not. As for fixed costs, this variable is only
observable for firms that have chosen to produce abroad. We compute the
expected value of foreign affiliates sales at the sector level to scale the fixed
costs. We believe that this average fixed costs share is a good proxy for ex-ante
expectations over the sector-specific component of the fixed costs share. We
use this variable in non-logarithmic form. We also include an FDI openness
indicator as a measure of country variance in fixed costs. It is defined in the
same way as trade openness and also is taken from the Global Competitiveness
Report.
We use two alternative measures to account for the heterogeneity: the number
of foreign affiliates per firm and the sales of the parent firm. According to
the theory, potential and actual sales in the foreign country are monotonic
functions of the parent firm’s sales. Thus, sales of the parent firm perfectly
catch the firm-specific component of foreign affiliates’ sales. The disadvantage
of this variable comes from the data: it is only available beginning with 2002.
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Thus, we use the 2002 sales of the parent firm for all years. The number of
affiliates, in contrast, can be calculated for all parent firms and for each year.
The number of affiliates and parent firms’ sales are positively correlated in
theory and in the data. Given the log-linearization applied in (7), we use the
parent firm’s sales in logarithmic form. The number of affiliates, in contrast,
is not used in logarithmic form.
Therefore, we match our discrete dependent variable at the level of the firm
to a set of exogenous variables at the country, the sector, and the firm level
to estimate equation (7).
4.3 Sample and regression equation
Although we have, in principle, information on the foreign activities of German
firms in 177 host countries, we do not observe some explanatory variables for
some countries. 10 Therefore, the effective sample size is restricted to 86 coun-
tries, including a large number of developing countries and emerging markets.
For some of these countries, we could not obtain information on all manu-
facturing sectors. However, the information that we lose is rather small even
in terms of the absolute number of observations. The unconsidered countries
account for about 16.3% of the number of foreign affiliates of German multi-
national firms and 9.6% of their sales. We believe that this does not bias our
results because the summary statistics of the full and of the most often used
sample in Table 2 look very similar.
– Insert Table 2 about here –
Our largest sample includes 68,362 observations. We pool data for the eight-
year period from 1996 to 2003. A particular combination of a parent firm’s
10This concerns mostly low-income countries.
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sector and a foreign country can occur several times even for the same year
because more than one German firm from a particular sector engages in a
particular foreign country. There are, for instance, 99 observations for French
affiliates of German firms in chemicals in 1997. Thus, we have much more
observations than the 10,320 different combinations of 86 foreign countries
and 15 parent-firm sectors over eight years. The observations in our largest
sample split into 36,010 affiliates active in a manufacturing sector and 32,352
affiliates active in wholesale.
For the analysis of more complex decision structures, we rely on a sub-sample
that includes only the firms for which we have information about the parent
firm’s sales in 2002. This sub-sample includes 44,138 observations from 50
countries. They divide into 23,561 observations of affiliates in manufacturing
and 20,577 in wholesale.
Finally, note that only 11.8% of the firms in our sample have a manufacturing
affiliate and a wholesale affiliate in a particular foreign market. Firms do either
sell through a wholesale affiliate (and do not own a affiliate in manufactur-
ing) to a foreign country (18,333 cases) or produce abroad (hold an affiliate
in manufacturing and no wholesale affiliate) in a particular foreign country
(20,577 cases). This demonstrates that firms actually face the decision to sell
through a wholesale affiliate or to produce abroad.
Given the discussion of the explanatory variables, we obtain the empirical
model, which is given by equation (8).
Iijk= β0 + β1
(
ln(wGerk )− ln(wForjk )
)
+ β2ln(distance) + β3border (8)
+ β4
Fk
average salesk
+ β5ln(parent productivity) + µkDk + ηtDt + uijk
with β1 =
ρ
(1−ρ) , β2 =
λρ
(1−ρ) , and β3 = δ
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wGerk and w
For
jk denote wages in sector k in Germany and in the foreign coun-
try j, respectively. Fk denotes the average fixed costs of affiliates in sector
k. average salesk is the average sales of the foreign affiliate in sector k.
parent productivityi denotes the proxy for a German parent firm’s produc-
tivity to capture the productivity differences among the affiliates. Dk and Dt
denote sector and time dummies, respectively. Finally, uijk is the error term.
We expect β1 to be positive. The larger the cost advantage abroad is, the
higher the probability of producing in the foreign country will be. β2 is also
expected to be positive. Higher trade costs lead to a higher profitability in pro-
ducing abroad. We proxy the last term in equation (7) by β0+β4
Fk
average salesk
+
β5parent productivityi and expect β4 to be negative and β5 to be positive.
The probit model relies crucially on the assumption of homoskedasticity in the
underlying latent variable model. We use the Huber-White method to correct
for heteroscedasticity. Because the data are pooled over years, we include
time dummy variables and correct for serial-correlation following Wooldridge
(2002). Finally, because the model is non-linear in its parameters, the marginal
effects are not constant and must be interpreted at some sample point. We
choose the means of the independent variables for this evaluation.
5 Results
We estimate equation (8) using a robust probit estimator, which assumes that
observations are independent but not necessarily identical distributed among
groups. Since the sample includes affiliates belonging to different parent firms
and are active in different sectors and in different countries, we have quite a
lot of heterogeneity in the data. The group structure implies fewer restrictions
on the data. We choose the sector of the affiliate as the criteria to cluster the
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data.
5.1 Pooled panel estimation
Table 3 presents the estimates for the marginal effects of our baseline regres-
sions. In almost two-thirds of the 68,362 cases we observe, the model predicts
the correct outcome.
– Insert Table 3 about here –
In the first baseline regression (B1), we estimate a symmetric-firm version of
the model, i.e. we do not use a parent firm variable as a regressor. In the second
and the third regressions (B2) and (B3), we propose the two specifications
that are the most parsimonious in modeling the trade and the fixed costs. In
the fourth and the fifth regressions (B4) and (B5), we include the trade and
the FDI openness variables. We expect a negative effect of trade openness
and a positive effect on the FDI openness. We include sector and time dummy
variables in all regressions, which control for unobserved trade costs and global
business cycle effects.
The coefficients of the relative wage costs have the expected signs in all five
regressions. They are positive and statistically significant at the 1% signifi-
cance level. A positive coefficient of the wage difference ln(wGerk ) − ln(wFork )
indicates a higher probability of producing abroad, the lower the wage is in
the foreign country. Not surprisingly, lower costs are a driving force of the
internationalization of production.
The coefficients of the distance variable and the border dummy have the ex-
pected signs, too. A larger distance increases the probability of producing
abroad. German multinational firms choose to sell through a wholesale trade
affiliate in markets that are close by. However, neighboring countries host
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more production units. The coefficient of the trade openness variable has the
right negative sign and is significant at least at 5%. Including trade openness
reduces the effect of the distance variable.
The coefficient of the fixed costs share variable has the expected sign and is
statistically significant at the 5% level. Thus, all three elements of the theory -
wage differences, trade costs, and fixed costs - find support in the data. The size
of the parent firms is statistically significant at the 5% level in regression (B3)
and (B5). Larger parent firms have a higher probability of producing abroad.
Doubling parent firm size increases the probability by about 1%. Note that
the standard deviation of parent size is particularly high. Hence, larger firms
have a much higher likelihood of producing abroad. The number of affiliates,
in contrast, is not significant. Measuring parent firms’ productivity by the
number of its affiliates does not give support to a positive productivity effect
on production abroad.
We use our estimates of the coefficients β1 of specification (B4) to compute the
structural parameter ρ. The degree of differentiation among the products of the
firms is one of the structural parameters of the proximity-concentration model.
This degree determines firms’ mark-up. Since β1 is given by
ρ
(1−ρ) , we can
determine ρ, which equals 0.12 and implies an elasticity of substitution of 1.14.
This estimate is consistent with the theory, which assumes ρ to be between
zero and one. However, the implied ρ is much lower than the parameters used
in theoretical models and the resulting elasticity of substitution is far lower
than those that have been found in other empirical studies. We think that is
due to the fact that we measure the degree of differentiation between firms
but not products.
The wage differential yields robust results in all specifications. Relatively low
foreign production costs favor foreign production over wholesale trade. Given
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the lower wages in the Czech Republic relative to those in France, the prob-
ability that German firms will set up a foreign production unit in the Czech
Republic is 40% higher than in France. 11 Concerning the effect of distance,
this probability is 13% higher in Australia than in France. 12
5.2 Sensitivity analysis: estimation refinements
In this section, we conduct three sensitivity analyzes. First, we check whether
a possible omitted variable bias drives our result. The underlying CES demand
structure restricts market size to having the same effect on the profits of both
strategies. The market size cancels out in equation (3b). This feature of the
model seems to be a strong abstraction. Empirical evidence points to the
fact that larger markets favor production abroad (Yeaple, 2005; Buch, et al.
2005). Therefore, we control for the partner countries’ market size in our three
sensitivity checks.
Second, we correct for that we have treated firms in the baseline regression as
if they were all of the horizontal type. This is definitely not true for all parent
firms that have affiliates classified in a different industry. Since the theoretical
model applies only to horizontal firms, we run our regression considering a
smaller sample that excludes all cases in which affiliates and parent companies
are classified in different sectors. In our second sensitivity analysis, we do not
consider ”non-horizontal” multinationals, dropping them from the sample.
Third, we control for fixed effects at the firm level.
We present the results of the sensitivity analysis in Table 4. In specification
(S1) we repeat the baseline regression (B4) but add the market size variable.
In specifications (S2) and (S3) of Table 4, we show the results for firms that
11The manufacturing wages were 5 times higher in France than in the Czech Re-
public in 2003.
12Australia is 18 times further away from Germany than France is.
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are only ”horizontal”. In (S3) we include only firms that are directly held by
German parent firms. We exclude 20,942 firms that are either held through a
third firm or by parents controlled by a foreign firm.
Including the market size variable does not change the magnitude and signif-
icance of the coefficients of the other variables. The coefficient of market size
is positive and statistically significant at 1% in all three regressions. The eco-
nomic significance of the variable is sizable, but not huge. The larger market
size of France relative to the Netherlands (which is similar to France in all
other respects) increases the probability of production there relative to whole-
sale sales by about 14%. Thus, market size affects positively the probability
of producing abroad given the fixed costs share.
– Insert Table 4 about here –
The columns (S2) and (S3) report the results for the sample with only ”hori-
zontal” firms. The qualitative results are the same as in regression (S1) and are
similar to the baseline regressions. The signs of the coefficient are unchanged.
The overall predictive power is similar to the one found in the baseline re-
gression. The small change in (S2) compared to the baseline models is not
surprising given the small sample variation. However, the small change in the
number of observations is an interesting result in its own right. Dropping
”non-horizontal” firms reduces the sample by 9.4% of the observations.
The sample contains information about 4,767 firms in 14,656 firm country
combinations. Among them, there are only 784 firms that switch their strategy
from wholesale export to production abroad or vice versa over the eight-year
period. Hence, most of the information comes from the cross-section variation.
However, the low number of switching firms indicates that the observations
might not be independent across years. Instead, there might be unobserved
and, therefore, uncontrolled effects that influence a firm’s decision to choose
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one or the other decision. We use a fixed effect logit model to control for these
effects. 13 Column (S4) presents the estimates of the fixed effects logit model.
The firm-level fixed effect model makes use only of the observations of firms
that switch strategies. All non-switching firms drop from the analysis. Thus,
we are left with 3,863 observations from 784 switching firms. The low num-
ber of observations and the fact that only time variance is used results in the
insignificance of the FDI openness coefficient. The time-invariant distance, bor-
der, and parent size variables are perfectly collinear and, therefore, drop from
the estimation results. According to the theory, the fixed costs share should
not vary over time, either. We believe that the positive coefficient of the fixed
costs share is due to yearly variations in our data and does not point to a
positive effect of fixed costs on production abroad in the data. The insignif-
icance of the coefficient is in line with the theory and our expectation. All
other coefficients except FDI openness have the expected signs. In particular,
a higher trade openness of a country decreases the probability of producing
there relative to selling through a wholesale affiliate. Given the small number
of switching firms and the low variance in some of the explanatory variables,
we put more weight on the pooled regressions, which use the variance from
the cross-section.
5.3 Sensitivity analysis: more complex decision structures
So far, we excluded the strategy that chooses to sell at home and not abroad
from the analysis. However, this strategy is a rational outcome in our model.
Firms that choose not to be active in a particular country just find the con-
dition piWSiF ∨ piMiF ≥ 0 of equation (1) not satisfied. We check if our results
13The incidental parameter problem lets us refrain from probit fixed effects re-
gressions. This problem does not arise in fixed effects logit models (Wooldridge,
2002).
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are sensitive to the inclusion of this strategy. Moreover, the model predicts
a sorting with respect to productivity or size for each foreign country: the
most productive (the largest) firms produce in the foreign country, less pro-
ductive (smaller) firms sell through their wholesale trade affiliates, and even
less productive firms do not engage in activities in this country at all. We
verify whether this theoretical result finds support in our data.
Therefore, we inflate the sample to account for the option not to engage in a
particular foreign country. 14 We now consider three outcomes: I=0 refers to
no service, I=1 refers to sales through a wholesale trade unit, and I=2 refers to
production abroad. Inflating the sample by filling in all of the ”missing” firm-
country-year combinations for the countries for which we have the explanatory
data yields a total of 602,971 observations, of which 558,839 are zeros, 20,575
are ones (wholesale-trade exports), and 23,557 are twos (production abroad).
The multinomial probit estimator can deal with more than two outcomes of the
discrete endogenous variable. We apply this estimator to our three outcome
using the no-activity alternative as baseline. We present the marginal effects
of the exogenous variables on the decision to sell through a wholesale affiliate
compared to not engaging in the country in column (MNP1) of Table 5 and
the marginal effects concerning the decision to produce in the foreign country
in column (MNP2). Although estimated in a single framework, the estimated
coefficients can be interpreted as in the simple probit case, with no activity
being the benchmark in both cases.
– Insert Table 5 about here –
We apply the structure of the decision between wholesale trade and production
14 Since we work with the whole population of German foreign affiliates and a
rather low reporting limit, we are confident that a firm-country-year combination
that does not exist in the data before its extension refers to firms that has choosen
not to serve the particular market. Since 2002, German enterprises have reported
their international capital links if the direct investment enterprises balance sheet
total exceeds 3 million Euros.
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abroad on a pair of decisions that do not have exactly the same structure.
Thus, some of the variables do not serve a particular purpose or even reflect
something different. In testing the theory, this robustness check is, therefore,
very interesting, although not all variables are easy to interpret. There are
four results that are particularly important for our analysis. First, the wage
differential has the opposite sign in column (MNP1) and (MNP2). Whereas
the wage difference reflects cost differences in the production abroad vs. no
activity decision (MNP2) there is no such comparison in the wholesale vs.
no activity decision in (MNP1). The negative sign there might reflect per-
capita income differences between the countries rather than cost differentials.
Second, the fixed cost share does not serve any purpose in the wholesale vs.
no activity decision in (MNP1). It is insignificant which is in line with the
theory. In the production abroad vs. no activity decision (MNP2), in contrast,
the fixed costs share has the expected negative sign. Third, the distance costs
(including border and openness) favor no activity in both decisions. That
has been found in several studies at all levels of aggregations. Fourth, the
firm specific productivity, proxied by the parent firm’s size, is positive and
significant in both decisions. More productive firms chose activity in a foreign
country rather than no activity.
The multinomial probit estimates decision structures with more than two out-
comes that are unordered. But according to the theory, the decision among the
three options is ordered with respect to firms’ productivity. We implement this
ordering by using a generalized ordered logit model. In an ordered model, the
difference in the outcomes 1 vs. 2 for wholesale trade vs. production abroad
becomes meaningful in that 2 is not only different but higher than 1. This
higher order requires the latent variable to exceed a threshold that is higher
for the production case than for the wholesale case while the coefficients are
24
the same for both decisions. However, there is no ordering with respect to all
variables but only with respect to productivity. Therefore, we use a general-
ized ordered logit model that restricts the coefficient of the productivity to be
identical for all groups, whereas the other parameters are free to differ. Thus,
we estimate a partial proportional odds model that enforces the ordering on
productivity.
The results are given in Table (5). The coefficients of column (GOL1) can be
interpreted as the effect on not engaging in a particular country relative to
the other two alternative strategies (I=0 vs. I=1 & I=2). The coefficients of
column (GOL2) can be interpreted as the effect on wholesale trade relative
to foreign production. Positive coefficients indicate that higher values of the
explanatory variable make it more likely that the respondent will be in a
higher category than the current one, while negative coefficients indicate that
higher values of the explanatory variable increase the likelihood of being in
the current or a lower category.
The results from the generalized ordered logit are consistent with our the-
oretical findings. In particular, the results from (GOL2) confirm the earlier
findings of the probit regressions. Note that the decision not to be active in
the particular country at all, which is displayed in column (GOL1), is also in
line with the theory. Foreign activities are more likely the more productive
the German multinational firms is. Distance and fixed costs negatively affect
the likelihood to be active in the foreign market. We find that openness and
the size of the partner country positively affect the probability of being active
abroad. The positive effect of the wage difference stems only from the decision
to produce abroad, and not from the wholesale decision.
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6 Conclusion
We analyze manufacturers’ decision to serve a foreign market based on a sim-
ple proximity-concentration model with heterogeneous firms. The model is
estimated using a detailed dataset on multinational firms’ foreign activities.
We find support for the fixed costs-variable costs trade-off spelled out by the
theory. Production abroad is positively affected by trade costs, while it is de-
terred by plant-level fixed costs. Moreover, the probability of producing abroad
increases with the size of the parent firm.
Additionally, we found strong evidence for wage differences affecting the de-
cision to produce in a foreign country or to sell there through a wholesale
affiliate. Wage differences have a positive effect on the probability of pro-
ducing abroad, which is statistically significant at least at the 5% level and
robust across the different specifications. At the micro level, the importance
of cost differentials appears much stronger than those found in studies using
aggregate data.
We conduct some robustness checks to assess the effect of market size on
firms’ decision to supply a particular foreign market. We find that market
size has a positive and significant effect on the decision to set up a production
unit abroad. Market size positively affects the probability of producing abroad
given the fixed costs share because the larger market also allows less productive
firms to cover the fixed costs. This result is robust across different specifications
and different sub-samples.
Considering more complex decision structures supports the results and leaves
the main conclusions unchanged. We use a multinomial probit model to ana-
lyze all three outcomes: no activity, wholesale trade, and production abroad,
within one framework. It offers a valuable robustness check because the pre-
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dictions from the theory differ for the effect of the wage differential and the
fixed costs share on wholesale trade and production abroad. We find these dif-
ferences in the data. In the generalized ordered logit estimation, we imposed
the parallel lines assumption from the theory on productivity. The results
concerning the choice between distribution- and production-related FDI are
robust to these changes in the regression framework. In sum, we find the el-
ements of the wholesale versus production abroad decision to be robust and
important at the firm level.
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Table 1
Construction of the Sample
Whole Population of
Affiliates 1996 - 2004
Manufacturing
Parents Only
Sample Used
Observations 231,082 110,306 65,724
Countries 177 148 51
Composition of the Sample - Observations Broken Down by Sector of Affiliate
Manufacturing 71,060 50,058 34,171
Countries 131 118 51
Wholesale 78,224 46,772 31,553
Countries 132 119 51
Services 79,522 17,409 -
Countries 169 102 -
Resources 2,276 220 -
Countries 76 33 -
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Table 2
Summary Statistics
Original sample
Obs. Mean Std. dev.
Aff. sales 74,293 50,386 603,785
Wage difference 68,362 0.7097 0.8812
Distance 76,587 3,343 3,848
Sector output 76,587 539,660 970,364
Fixed cost share 76,587 0.5641 0.2549
Number of parent- 76,587
affiliate combinations (100%)
I=1 41,323
manufacturing (54.0%)
I=0 35,264
wholesale (46.0%)
Used sample
Obs. Mean Std. dev.
Aff. sales 65,724 52,467 636,088
Wage difference 65,724 0.7040 0.8755
Distance 65,724 3,243 3,828
Sector output 64,497 564,148 1008,413
Fixed cost share 65,724 0.5626 0.2528
Number of parent- 65,724
affiliate combinations (100%)
I=1 34,171
manufacturing (52.0%)
I=0 31,553
wholesale (48.0%)
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Table 3
Marginal effects of probit regression (pooled probit analysis 1996-2003)
(B1) (B2) (B3) (B4) (B5)
Production abroad = 1 Symmetric Heterog. Heterog. Additional Additional
Firms Firms Firms Controls Controls
Wage difference 0.0831*** 0.0816*** 0.0727*** 0.1053*** 0.0794***
(11.85) (10.36) (10.43) (7.98) (6.13)
Distance 0.0168*** 0.0162*** 0.0159*** 0.0105*** 0.0120***
(5.40) (4.94) (5.00) (4.13) (4.49)
Fixed costs share -0.0492*** -0.0492*** -0.0510** -0.0489*** -0.0447**
(3.11) (3.27) (2.29) (3.16) (1.98)
Number of affiliates 0.0005 0.0005
(1.25) (1.52)
Parent size 0.0094** 0.0110**
(2.10) (2.46)
Border 0.0189* 0.0209** 0.0318** 0.0228** 0.0314**
(1.65) (2.04) (2.24) (2.22) (2.05)
Trade openness -0.0252*** -0.0305***
(3.88) (3.96)
FDI openness 0.0216** 0.0095
(2.51) (1.00)
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 68,362 68,362 46,971 65,724 44,138
Log-Likelihood -43,653 -43,619 -29,946 -41,744 -28,118
Correct pred. zero 64.1% 64.2% 54.9% 65.5% 58.4%
Correct pred. one 61.2% 62.6% 68.7% 61.8% 66.1%
Overall correct 62.6% 63.4% 62.4% 63.5% 62.5%
Robust z-values in parentheses. * Significantly different from 0 at 10% level.
**,*** Significantly different from 0 at 5% level and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 4
Robustness check: marginal effects of probit regressions using variations of the sam-
ple (pooled probit and fixed effects logit analysis 1996-2003)
(S1) (S2) (S3) (S4)
Production abroad Including
Market size
Horizontal
Firms only
Directly hold
Horiz. firms
Firm fixed
Effects
Wage difference 0.1614*** 0.1625*** 0.1685*** 0.7690***
(17.61) (16.63) (19.11) (3.68)
Distance 0.0130*** 0.0151*** 0.0134***
(5.09) (6.66) (4.74)
Market size 0.0349*** 0.0326*** 0.0292*** 0.5309***
(7.84) (5.88) (5.64) (2.86)
Fixed costs share -0.0397*** -0.0472*** -0.0605*** 0.2921
(2.69) (2.65) (3.17) (1.11)
Number of affiliates 0.0006* 0.0002 0.0003 0.0056
(1.71) (0.74) (1.02) (1.45)
Border 0.0420*** 0.0383*** 0.0318***
(3.91) (5.07) (2.99)
Trade openness 0.0041 -0.0012 -0.0090 -0.1873*
(0.59) (0.17) (0.86) (1.81)
FDI openness 0.0418*** 0.0447*** 0.0427*** -0.070
(5.19) (5.74) (4.57) (0.78)
Sector dummy variable Yes Yes Yes
Time dummy variable Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 64,497 59,552 38,610 3,806
Log-likelihood 40,813 25,437 24,342 -1,502
Corrected predicted zeros 66.5% 75.9% 73.7%
Corrected predicted one 64.0% 51.9% 55.3%
Overall correct predicted 63.5% 64.4% 65.5%
Robust z-values in parentheses. * Significantly different from 0 at 10% level.
**,*** Significantly different from 0 at 5% level and 1% level, respectively.
35
Table 5
Complex decisions: multinomial probit (MNP) and generalized ordered logit (GOL)
regressions using a zero inflated sample (1996-2003)
(MNP1) (MNP2) (GOL1) (GOL2)
WS trade vs. Prod. abroad Foreign act.
vs.
Prod. abroad
No activity Vs. no activity No activity Vs. WS
trade
Wage difference -0.0026*** 0.0075*** 0.1421*** 0.1735***
(4.08) (5.87) (2.92) (8.89)
Distance -0.0038*** -0.0044** -0.2131*** 0.0401**
(6.82) (4.53) (5.34) (2.11)
Market size 0.0074*** 0.0126*** 0.5336*** 0.0151
(12.8) (23.0) (13.3) (0.96)
Fixed costs share -0.0014 -0.0066*** -0.2307** -0.1243**
(0.59) (2.66) (2.20) (2.20)
Parent size 0.0038*** 0.0056*** 0.2437***
(7.29) (8.85) (9.49)
Border 0.0106*** 0.0198*** 0.5863*** 0.0172
(7.53) (5.96) (10.3) (0.39)
Trade openness 0.0030*** 0.0039*** 0.1865*** 0.0239*
(8.17) (9.66) (5.82) (1.70)
FDI openness 0.0040*** 0.0076*** 0.3002** 0.0044
(3.99) (5.15) (4.71) (0.24)
Sector dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 602,971 602,971 602,971 602,971
Log-likelihood -154,396 -154,396 -154,559 -154,559
Robust z-values in parentheses. * Significantly different from 0 at 10% level.
**,*** Significantly different from 0 at 5% level and 1% level, respectively.
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